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A B S T R A C T
Adults' judgments regarding punishment can have important social ramifications. However, the origins of these
judgments remain unclear. Using the legal system as an example domain in which people receive punishment,
the current work employed two complementary approaches to examine how punishment-related concepts
emerge. Study 1 tested both 6- to 8-year-olds and adults to ascertain which components of “end-state” pun-
ishment concepts emerge early in development and remain stable over time, and which components of pun-
ishment concepts change with age. Children, like adults, agreed with and spontaneously generated behavioral
explanations for incarceration. However, children were more likely than adults to attribute incarceration to
internal characteristics. Neither children nor adults reported that incarceration stems from societal-level factors
such as poverty. Study 2 built on the results of Study 1 by probing the extent to which early punishment-related
concepts in the legal domain emerge from a specific form of social experience—namely, parental incarceration.
Children of incarcerated parents, like children whose parents were not incarcerated, were more likely to re-
ference internal and behavioral factors than societal factors when discussing why people come into contact with
the justice system. Taken together, these studies clarify how punishment-related concepts arise and therefore
contribute to theories of moral psychology, social cognitive development, and criminal justice.
1. Introduction
During season three of the American comedy television series “The
Office,” the employees of Dunder Mifflin Paper Company learned that
their new co-worker, Martin, previously spent time in prison. After
learning this information, the employees squandered much of the
workday speculating about why Martin had been incarcerated. While
some employees guessed that a specific societal-level reason (racism)
played a role in Martin's incarceration, others insinuated that Martin
was incarcerated for individual-level factors such as performing illegal
behaviors or possessing negative internal qualities.
Although the events described above are fictitious, attributions for
incarceration and other forms of punishment may have social con-
sequences. Generally, perceivers are more likely to help and feel posi-
tively toward individuals whose misfortune (e.g., incarceration or other
forms of punishment) is attributed to external versus individual-level
causes (e.g., Cochran, Boots, & Heide, 2003; Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, &
Tagler, 2001; Rudolph, Roesch, Greitemeyer, & Weiner, 2004). As such,
the inferences people make about why others receive punishment may
impact their attitudes and behaviors toward individuals who have
received one of society's harshest punishments—incarceration.
The present work investigated how punishment-related concepts
arise in two complementary ways. Study 1 investigated the origin of
adults' punishment concepts by asking how children and adults explain
incarceration. In doing so, Study 1 provided insight into which pun-
ishment concepts remain stable throughout development and which
change with age. Study 2 built on the results of Study 1 by probing the
extent to which social experiences during childhood alter the structure
of early-emerging punishment concepts. Specifically, Study 2 examined
the role of parental incarceration in children's concepts. Taken together,
these studies provide insight into how development (Study 1) and social
experience (Study 2) give rise to moral judgment related to punishment.
1.1. Studying punishment in the context of the criminal justice system
The current studies used the criminal justice system as an example
domain in which to study punishment-related concepts. We did so for
two reasons. First, prior experiments testing children's concepts of
punishment have typically focused on relatively minor moral trans-
gressions (e.g., breaking an object, failing to help another person,
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Bregant, Shaw, & Kinzler, 2016; Bregant, Wellbery, & Shaw, 2019;
Chernyak & Sobel, 2016; Cushman, Sheketoff, Wharton, & Carey, 2013;
Hamlin, 2013; Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010; Yang, Choi, Misch,
Yang, & Dunham, 2018). This literature makes crucial contributions to
the scientific understanding of how children judge moral violations that
they are likely to encounter in their own lives. At the same time, chil-
dren's inferences about severe moral transgressions remain unclear, and
their judgments about severe punishment might differ in important
ways from social cognition in other contexts. For instance, children may
be especially likely to make dispositional attributions in the context of
the criminal justice system because they infer that severely punished
actions are worse than actions that are less severely punished (Bregant
et al., 2016) and that people who perform particularly bad actions are
dispositionally bad people (Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015).
Second, incarceration touches the lives of millions of United States
residents. The United States incarcerates more people than any other
country (Mears & Cochran, 2015), amounting to more than 6.6 million
individuals serving time in an adult correctional facility at the end of
2016 (Kaeble & Cowhig, 2018). This high rate has collateral con-
sequences for children, 2.7 million of whom have an incarcerated
parent (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2010). Despite its commonality,
incarceration remains understudied within psychology. The current
work sought to clarify how people perceive individuals who have ex-
perienced this common form of punishment. Further, we asked how
these perceptions change with age and with greater personal experience
with the justice system.
1.2. Adults' punishment concepts
Psychologists have long sought to understand the factors underlying
adults' moral judgments (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Gray,
Young, & Waytz, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004;
Schein & Gray, 2018; Waytz & Young, 2012; Young & Tsoi, 2013).
Within this larger body of work, many have investigated the role of
mental states in judgments of right and wrong. Adults typically judge
accidental harms to be less severe than intentional ones (e.g., Chakroff,
Dungan, & Young, 2013; Cushman, 2008; Young & Saxe, 2011) and
blame those who have bad desires even when those desires are only
indirectly connected to a harmful event (e.g., a man coerced by at-
tackers to kill his wife's secret lover is seen as blameworthy because he
wanted his wife's lover dead anyway, Woolfolk, Doris, & Darley, 2006).
A related literature has examined how perceptions regarding another
type of internal quality—moral character—influences adults' judgments
of right and wrong (e.g., Alicke, 1992, 2000; Nadler & McDonnell,
2011; Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011). For example, in one line of work,
adults learned about individuals with good versus bad moral character
who committed a transgression (Nadler & McDonnell, 2011). Despite
the fact that each actor performed the same behavior, participants
judged the “bad” individual's actions more negatively than those of the
“good” individual.
Thus, converging lines of evidence suggest that transgressors' in-
ternal characteristics (e.g., intent, moral character) influence adults'
moral judgments. However, the factors underlying judgments of moral
wrongness do not perfectly mirror those that underlie judgments of
whether or not someone should receive punishment. Whereas wrongness
judgments largely hinge on internally-oriented factors such as intent
and moral character, judgments concerning punishment are highly
contingent on behaviors themselves (Cushman, 2008; Cushman,
Dreber, Wang, & Costa, 2009). In one experiment demonstrating this
effect (Cushman et al., 2009), adults punished individuals whose be-
haviors caused negative outcomes even when their intentions were
good and rewarded individuals whose behaviors caused positive out-
comes even when their intentions were bad. Given that behavioral
factors weigh heavily on adults' own punishment decisions, it is possible
that adults conceptualize punishment as primarily stemming from be-
haviors. Further, extant legal norms may reinforce this link between
punishment and behavior. Adults conflate prescriptive norms (how
people should behave) with descriptive norms (what types of behaviors
are common, Eriksson, Strimling, & Coultas, 2015). That is, adults
reason that what should occur actually does occur. In the United States,
doctrines in criminal law assert that people should be punished for their
behaviors and that extra-legal factors (e.g., inferences about an in-
dividual's moral character) should not influence punishment decisions
in most cases (People v. White, 1840). Therefore, adults may infer that
people are severely punished (e.g., incarcerated) for their behaviors,
and not for internal reasons, because of legal standards specifying what
should occur.
Within moral psychology, much work on punishment has focused
on participants' propensity to link punishment with particular beha-
viors. Within this tradition, relatively less work has examined how
adults might think about another factor that underlies punishment
decisions—societal inequality. Recent scholarship has highlighted how
systems of punishment (e.g., the American criminal justice system)
disproportionately impact people who are marginalized on the basis of
group memberships, particularly race (e.g., Alexander, 2012; Forbes,
2016; Forman, 2017; Glaser, 2015; Harcourt, 2007; Travis, Western, &
Redburn, 2014). Black people are stereotyped as criminals (Eberhardt,
Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 2004) and are over-represented in United States
jails and prisons (Alexander, 2012; Forman, 2017). Furthermore, their
experiences in the legal system are strikingly different from Whites'
experiences. Black children are perceived as older than White children
of the same age and treated more harshly as a result (Goff, Jackson, Di
Leone, Culotta, & DiTomasso, 2014; Rattan, Levine, Dweck, &
Eberhardt, 2012). Black adults and adults who look stereotypically
Black are more likely than White adults and adults who look less ste-
reotypically Black to face racial profiling (Glaser, 2015; Tyler &
Wakslak, 2004) and to find themselves on the receiving end of gov-
ernment violence (Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson,
2006; Kahn, Goff, Lee, & Motamed, 2016). Disadvantage based on race
can compound disadvantages based on other group memberships, such
as gender (Allen, Flaherty, & Ely, 2010; Rathbone, 2007) and socio-
economic status (Eubanks, 2018). Though converging evidence sug-
gests that societal factors such as racism and poverty play a critical role
in mass incarceration, it is likely that societal factors lay at the per-
iphery of adults' punishment-related concepts because adults often
underestimate the scope of societal inequality (Davidai & Gilovich,
2015; Kraus, Rucker, & Richeson, 2017; Norton & Ariely, 2011). In one
line of work, participants, on average, overestimated current levels of
racial economic equality by nearly 25% (Kraus et al., 2017). Given that
adults often misperceive the extent to which societal inequality impacts
the lives of others, they may not readily link punishment with societal
factors.
In sum, past work has provided critical insight into how adults
might conceptualize punishment, suggesting that adults may view legal
punishment as stemming from behavioral—but not internal or socie-
tal—factors. However, the origin of these “end-state” punishment
concepts remains unclear. By investigating early punishment concepts,
it is possible to learn which components of “end-state” punishment
concepts are present even before most children become acquainted with
formal, complex systems of punishment governing society. Doing so can
also clarify how adult sociopolitical thought is constrained by early
childhood cognition. Indeed, other programs of research argue that
some psychological processes that emerge during childhood shape adult
cognition (e.g., Block & Block, 2006; Fraley, Griffin, Belsky, & Roisman,
2012; Heiphetz, Spelke, & Young, 2015; Hussak & Cimpian, 2018). A
similar analysis may apply to early-developing punishment concepts.
Certain components of punishment concepts may emerge early in on-
togeny, remain stable over time, and, thus, guide socio-moral judgment
throughout development. Drawing on research from social, cognitive,
and developmental psychology, the following section lays out several
possibilities regarding which components of children's punishment
concepts remain stable throughout development and which undergo
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change.
1.3. Which components of punishment-related concepts remain stable
throughout development and which change with age?
Conceptual development has traditionally been understood as
overhauling naïve theories guiding childhood thinking and reasoning
with more sophisticated, accurate concepts (for a review, see Shtulman
& Lombrozo, 2016). In other words, conceptual development has tra-
ditionally been synonymous with “conceptual replacement.” However,
more recent models suggest that “end-state” concepts consist of two co-
existing bundles of concepts: those that have remained stable since
childhood and those that have changed over the course of development
(e.g., Eidson & Coley, 2014; Goldberg & Thompson-Schill, 2009;
Heiphetz, Gelman, & Young, 2017; Heiphetz, Lane, Waytz, & Young,
2016; Kelemen, Rottman, & Seston, 2013; Shtulman & Schulz, 2008).
While “end-state” punishment concepts likely follow this trend, it is
unclear which components of these concepts change with age and
which remain relatively stable from childhood to adulthood.
Evidence hints that the link between behavioral factors and pun-
ishment is stable across development. In one study, children between
the ages of four and eight years consistently reported that accidental
harms were punishable but not necessarily morally wrong and that
attempted, but failed, harms were morally wrong but not necessarily
punishable (Cushman et al., 2013). These results suggest that children's
punishment decisions, like those of adults (Cushman, 2008; Cushman
et al., 2009), are sensitive to the outcomes of harmful behaviors. Given
that children's judgments about punishment largely hinge on behavioral
factors, children may infer that others receive punishment for beha-
vioral reasons.
While the link between punishment and behaviors may remain
stable across age, the link between punishment and internal char-
acteristics may change. This possibility is grounded in prior work in
developmental and cognitive psychology demonstrating that children,
compared to adults, are especially likely to navigate the social world
with an eye toward internal characteristics. Children's attention to in-
ternal states may be rooted in psychological essentialism—the tendency
to view others' characteristics as arising from internal, immutable,
biologically-based “essences” (Gelman, 2003; Medin & Ortony, 1989).
In one study investigating age-related changes in essentialist perspec-
tives, children and adults learned about a baby girl who was adopted at
birth by a man who lived on an island with only male inhabitants
(Taylor, Rhodes, & Gelman, 2009). Participants then indicated whether
this girl would play with tea sets and dolls—activities to which she had
never been exposed—or whether she would grow up to enjoy the ste-
reotypically masculine activities that those around her performed, such
as fishing and playing with baseball cards. Put another way, partici-
pants indicated whether they perceived the adopted child as having an
immutable, biologically-based female “essence.” Five- to six-year-olds
perceived the child to have an innate, internal essence that guided her
gender-linked behaviors and preferences, whereas adults perceived a
greater environmental influence. In line with other research demon-
strating that essentialism typically decreases with age (e.g., Chalik,
Leslie, & Rhodes, 2017; Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014; Gelman, Heyman,
& Legare, 2007; Heiphetz, in press; Heiphetz et al., 2017; Taylor et al.,
2009), it is possible that children's concepts of punishment rely on
judgments about internal characteristics even more than do those of
adults.
Thus, past work suggests that both children and adults may link
punishment with behavior and that children, more than adults, may
link punishment with internal characteristics. Competing predictions
can be made about the link between punishment and the third factor
discussed above, societal inequality. On the one hand, children report
less positivity toward individuals who lack resources (e.g., Horwitz,
Shutts, & Olson, 2014; Li, Spitzer, & Olson, 2014; Shutts, Brey,
Dornbusch, Slywotzky, & Olson, 2016) or are low in status (e.g.,
Dunham, Chen, & Banaji, 2013; Newheiser, Dunham, Merrill, Hoosain,
& Olson, 2014) than toward more privileged individuals. Moreover,
young children sometimes perpetuate resource-based inequality, sug-
gesting they believe that certain groups are not entitled to fair treat-
ment (Olson, Dweck, Spelke, & Banaji, 2011; also see McGillicuddy-De
Lisi, Daly, & Neal, 2006). Given that children engage in punishment-like
behaviors toward those who are subject to societal inequality (see
Travis, 2002, for prior work conceptualizing social exclusion and re-
source inequality as forms of punishment), they may judge that similar
types of societal factors play a role in punishment and incarceration. On
the other hand, past work suggests that younger children may under-
estimate the extent to which others' misfortune is caused by externally-
oriented, uncontrollable factors (e.g., societal inequality, Leahy, 1983;
Neff, Cooper, & Woodruff, 2007). Therefore, children may be unlikely
to attribute punishment and incarceration to societal inequality. In this
way, they would respond similarly to adults, who, as previously men-
tioned, underestimate the extent to which social inequality influences
life outcomes (e.g., Kraus et al., 2017).
In sum, the current work assessed children's and adults' judgments
regarding incarceration to gain insight into which components of
punishment-related concepts change and which remain stable across
development. Past work suggests that children, like adults, may link
punishment with behavior. Past work also suggests that children may
be more likely than adults to link punishment with internal character-
istics. Finally, past work supports two alternative predictions regarding
age-related change or stability in associations between punishment and
societal inequality. The current work tested these possibilities.
1.4. How might experience with parental incarceration shape punishment-
related concepts?
Above, we outlined how punishment concepts might change or stay
the same across age. However, the developmental trajectories outlined
above are agnostic to the idea that developing concepts are shaped by
children's social experiences (for evidence that social experience shapes
concepts, see Byers-Heinlein & Garcia, 2015; Chalik et al., 2017; Deeb,
Segall, Birnbaum, Ben-Eliyahu, & Diesendruck, 2011; Kinzler & Dautel,
2012; Mandalaywala, Ranger-Murdock, Amodio, & Rhodes, 2018;
Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Roberts &
Gelman, 2016; Smyth, Feeney, Eidson, & Coley, 2017). As previously
mentioned, millions of children in the United States have had experi-
ence with the criminal justice system due to parental incarceration (The
Pew Charitable Trusts, 2010). Yet, it is unclear how this experience may
shape the trajectory of punishment-related concepts. The current work
addressed this question. Drawing on separate literatures investigating
(1) the role of intergroup contact on essentialism and (2) the role of
social input on children's beliefs, we outline three ways in which par-
ental incarceration may shape developing moral judgments.
1.4.1. The possible role of intergroup contact
Prior work has argued that essentialism arises from basic cognitive
processes but that personal experiences and social input shape how and
when children employ essentialist beliefs (e.g., Chalik et al., 2017;
Kinzler & Dautel, 2012; Roberts & Gelman, 2016). However, different
theoretical proposals make distinct predictions regarding the impact of
personal experiences and social input on essentialist views. On the one
hand, some work suggests that intergroup contact may decrease es-
sentialist reasoning. Children who attend religiously (Smyth et al.,
2017) and ethnically (Deeb et al., 2011) diverse schools exhibit less
essentialist beliefs about each respective social group than those who
attend homogenous schools. Furthermore, children exposed to lin-
guistic diversity are less likely to report that language is inherited and
stable than are monolingual children (Byers-Heinlein & Garcia, 2015).
Given that experiences with stigmatized group members can reduce
essentialism regarding those groups, it is possible that the incarceration
of a close family member may lead children to reject the idea that
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contact with the justice system is determined by stable, inherited
properties.
On the other hand, some studies suggest that increased contact with
members of a particular group may bolster essentialist views of in-
dividuals belonging to that group. For example, compared to White
children, Black children report more essentialist views of race (Kinzler
& Dautel, 2012; Roberts & Gelman, 2016), perhaps because experiential
factors (e.g., witnessing race-based discrimination) may facilitate racial
essentialism (see Quintana, 1994, 1998).1 Similar reasoning may apply
to how children of incarcerated parents think about contact with the
justice system. These children may be especially likely to witness dis-
crimination against people who have experienced contact with the
justice system (for evidence of such discrimination, see Forbes, 2016;
Pager, 2008; Western, Braga, Davis, & Sirois, 2015). In turn, they may
be especially likely to believe that people who are involved in this
system possess an internal “essence” that makes them different from
non-involved individuals.
1.4.2. The possible role of social input
Traditional theories of learning and conceptual development argue
that children acquire knowledge by directly interacting with the world
(e.g., Bruner, 1973; Needham, Barrett, & Peterman, 2002). However,
more recent work has pointed out that children acquire a great deal of
knowledge by listening to others (see Gelman, 2009, for review). While
the content of child-directed speech varies across contexts, other fea-
tures of language generalize across settings. Adults often use generic
statements—those that convey a property that generalizes to an entire
category, such as “tigers have stripes” or “girls like pink”—when
communicating with children (Gelman, Chesnick, & Waxman, 2005;
Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka, & Flukes, 2008; Gelman, Taylor, & Nguyen,
2004; Pappas & Gelman, 1998; Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012). Spe-
cifically, adults typically produce over 30 generic statements per hour
when speaking to children and, by extrapolation, hundreds of generic
statements per day (Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, Hartman, & Pappas,
1998). Given the prevalence of generic statements in child-directed
speech, adults may use similar language when talking to children about
punishment (e.g., incarceration).
For example, if a child asks what prison is, it may seem overly
complicated to provide a full explanation, and adults may default to
statements like “bad people go to prison” even if they would make more
nuanced statements to other adults (similarly to how adults may tell
children that “girls like pink” even while privately recognizing that not
all girls like pink and that some people who like pink are not girls).
Generic statements license the inference that category members have an
internal “essence” that creates the relevant property—that a “tiger es-
sence” leads to stripes or that a “girl essence” leads to liking pink
(Bloom, 2004; Cimpian & Markman, 2009; Rhodes et al., 2012).
Therefore, children who hear generic statements about punishment
may attribute criminal justice contact to internal factors, regardless of
whether or not they have personal experience with the justice system
(although, of course, such experience could play a crucial role in other
aspects of social cognition not tested here).
In sum, three different predictions could be made on the basis of
past research. While diverse social experiences sometimes decrease
essentialism (e.g., Smyth et al., 2017), other work has reported that
increased contact with certain groups may actually increase essentialist
views of individuals belonging to that group (e.g., Kinzler & Dautel,
2012; Roberts & Gelman, 2016). A third possibility suggests that views
of incarceration may be primarily informed by a common way in which
adults speak to children; if this is the case, both children of incarcerated
parents and children whose parents have never been incarcerated may
hold similar ideas about incarceration. Study 2 tested among these
possibilities as a way to understand how the social experience of having
an incarcerated parent might shape early concepts related to punish-
ment.
1.5. Overview of current research
The current work used both qualitative and quantitative methods to
investigate the origin and development of punishment-related concepts.
In Study 1, children and adults responded to an open-ended question
asking them to describe prison or jail and, subsequently, used a Likert-
type scale to indicate the extent to which they agree people are sent to
prison for different reasons. This study tested both children and adults
in the same paradigm to determine which components of punishment
concepts remain stable across development and which components
change. Study 2 built on the results of Study 1 by probing how di-
vergent social experiences during childhood might alter the structure of
early-emerging punishment concepts. Specifically, Study 2 recruited
both children of incarcerated parents and children whose parents were
not incarcerated to test the extent to which parental incarceration
shapes children's punishment-related concepts.
2. Study 1
Study 1 investigated how children and adults reason about why
people become incarcerated. In doing so, we sought to clarify the origin
of “end-state” punishment concepts and determine which components
of children's punishment concepts persist throughout development and
which change. Here and for Study 2, we report all conditions run,
measures collected, participant exclusions, and how sample sizes were
determined. Analyses for both studies were conducted only after all
data for that study had been collected.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Participants included 99 children between six and eight years old
(Mage= 6.94 years, SDage= .77 years; 50% female). Parents identified
their children as White or European-American (73%), Black or African-
American (5%), Asian or Asian-American (9%), Native American or
Pacific Islander (1%), multiracial (2%), or “other” (7%); the remaining
parents did not answer this question. Parents identified their child's
ethnicity by answering a separate question; 8% of participant were
identified as Hispanic or Latina/o. Responses from 13 additional chil-
dren were excluded for the following reasons: child did not understand
the words “prison” or “jail” (n=8), parents interfered during testing
(n=4), and child wanted to end study (n=1). Children were recruited
in a local museum or via a lab database; all children received a small
prize for participating.
We also recruited 168 adults between 19 and 69 years old
(Mage= 28.70 years, SDage= 11.10 years; 57% female). Adults com-
pleted a demographic questionnaire after answering all experimental
items; they self-identified as White or European-American (79%), Black
or African-American (4%), Asian or Asian-American (12%), multiracial
(4%), or “other” (2%). Additionally, 6% of adults self-identified as
Hispanic or Latina/o. Adults also indicated their political orientation
using a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Very liberal) to 7 (Very
conservative). On average, participants rated themselves as relatively
liberal (M=3.23, SD=1.48). Self-reported political orientation did
not reliably predict responses to the dependent measures in Study 1 (see
Supplementary Materials for relevant analyses).
Data from nine additional adults were excluded because they failed
to correctly answer an attention check question that required them to
1 The sample of children in Roberts and Gelman (2016) included children
belonging to several different racial minority groups. Eighteen children were
identified as Black, three children were identified as Asian, two children were
identified as Latino/a, and one child was identified as multiracial. However, the
authors note that all results hold when examining responses of only Black
children.
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recall one reason for incarceration that had been presented earlier in
the study. As is common in studies comparing children and adults (e.g.,
Cogsdill, Todorov, Spelke, & Banaji, 2014; Heiphetz et al., 2017;
Roussos & Dunham, 2016; Shtulman & Phillips, 2018; Smith &
Warneken, 2016; Starmans & Bloom, 2016), we recruited adults online,
via Amazon Mechanical Turk and the subject pool of a private uni-
versity in the United States, to increase the size and diversity of the
sample (for evidence suggesting that recruiting via Amazon Mechanical
Turk increases sample diversity, see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling,
2011; Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011). Preliminary analyses did not
reveal differences between adults who participated via Amazon Me-
chanical Turk and adults who participated via the subject pool; there-
fore, subsequent analyses collapsed across all adult participants. Adults
who participated via Amazon Mechanical Turk received $1.00, and
adults who participated via the subject pool received .5 credits.
Seven adults reported that they had previously served time in a jail
or prison. Additionally, four parents reported that their child knew an
incarcerated person. The main pattern of results reported in this study
emerged even when these participants were excluded from analyses.
Adults also indicated how many incarcerated people they knew, and
this variable did not reliably predict responses to the dependent mea-
sures in Study 1 (see Supplementary Materials for relevant analyses).
2.1.2. Procedure
Here and in Study 2, an experimenter tested children individually in
a quiet room. First, the experimenter told children that he or she would
ask questions about another person and that there were no right or
wrong answers. The experimenter then said, “I'm going to be asking you
some questions about prison and about people who are in prison. What
do you think prison is?”2 Asking children to describe prison using an
open-ended format allowed participants to spontaneously describe their
thoughts about incarceration when not guided by the interviewer.
While the original purpose of this question was to simply understand
how participants conceptualize incarceration, many children (and
adults) spontaneously offered reasons for why individuals become in-
carcerated when answering this question. The experimenter then asked,
“Okay, and what do you think prison is like?” The purpose of this
question was to further probe individuals' conceptions of incarceration.
Because this question did not directly concern the main question of the
current research—how children and adults explain incarceration—it
will not be discussed further.
While there are several benefits to open-ended items, one drawback
is that they may demand more cognitive and linguistic ability than do
closed-ended questions. As a result, open-ended questions may not fully
capture children's thoughts about complex topics (e.g., Ganea, Lillard,
& Turkheimer, 2004; Miller & Bartsch, 1997). Given the possibility that
children could not cogently articulate their thoughts when responding
to the open-ended question, we subsequently asked children a series of
closed-ended questions measuring their agreement with different ex-
planations for incarceration. In addition to potentially helping children
articulate their thoughts, closed-ended items allowed us to employ an
experimental design. By directly manipulating the independent variable
(explanation type), we could draw stronger inferences about the
structure of participants' punishment concepts.
Before asking children the closed-ended questions, the experimenter
introduced children to a five-point scale consisting of stick figures ar-
rayed from smallest to largest on a sheet of paper and instructed chil-
dren on how to use the scale (e.g., asking them to point to the smallest
picture if they didn't agree at all with a sentence the experimenter said).
The remaining labels were “agree a little bit,” “agree a medium
amount,” “agree a lot,” and “agree completely.” The experimenter
asked children two test questions to gauge their understanding of the
scale (e.g., “Can you show me where you would point if you didn't agree
with the answer at all?”). On average, children used the scale correctly:
they responded near scale floor (M=1.07, SD= .47) when indicating
that they “don't agree with the answer at all” and near the scale mid-
point (M=2.97, SD= .43) when indicating that they “agree a medium
amount.” Participants who answered incorrectly received corrective
feedback.
Following these instructions, the experimenter displayed a photo-
graph of a young Black or White man on a laptop and asked the fol-
lowing four experimental items in counterbalanced order:
• “How much do you agree that this person [pointing to photograph
displayed on laptop] is in prison because he is a bad person?” This
question was intended to measure the extent to which participants
endorsed an explanation highlighting an internal characteristic.
• “How much do you agree that this person is in prison because he did
something wrong?” This question was intended to measure the ex-
tent to which participants endorsed an explanation highlighting
behavioral attributions, i.e., attributions to a characteristic that
could potentially change over time (Gelman, 2003).
• “How much do you agree that this person is in prison because he
didn't have very much money when he was growing up?” This
question was intended to measure the extent to which participants
endorsed an explanation highlighting societal forces that are ne-
cessarily not tied to any individual. We tested children's endorse-
ment of economic inequality as a reason for incarceration, as op-
posed to other societal factors, because children of the age tested
here have some understanding that differences in wealth are asso-
ciated with disparate life outcomes (Leahy, 1983; Sigelman, 2012)
but do not consistently attribute negative outcomes to other societal
factors, such as racism (Quintana, 1994, 1998). Thus, we did not
probe participants' agreement with explanations linking race and
incarceration (though see Introduction for a review of relevant lit-
erature suggesting that the negative consequences of incarceration
disproportionally accrue to Black people).
• “How much do you agree that this person is in prison because he has
a younger brother?” This question was intended to measure the
extent to which participants endorsed an irrelevant explanation and
was designed to serve as a control item to ensure that children did
not simply agree with all explanations.3
Participants were randomly assigned to view either a White man
(nchildren= 47; nadults = 85) or a Black man (nchildren= 52;
nadults = 83).4 The purpose of this manipulation was to determine
whether the target's race influenced participants' explanations. Al-
though Black and White individuals can have very different experiences
in the legal system (e.g., Alexander, 2012; Eberhardt et al., 2006;
2 Half of the participants followed the same procedure but heard the word
“jail” instead of “prison.” This manipulation did not influence participants' re-
sponses, and data were collapsed across these two conditions.
3 After responding to the open-ended questions and prior to hearing any of
the explanations described in the main text, participants were asked to indicate
in a free-response manner why they thought the person was in prison. We in-
cluded this question because it was not clear a priori the extent to which re-
sponses to the question, “What is prison?” would offer spontaneous explana-
tions for why people might become incarcerated. However, a substantial
number of participants did offer such explanations. Because participants' re-
sponses to subsequent items may depend on responses to previous items (e.g.,
their first response is likely to reflect their first intuition, and subsequent re-
sponses may differ because participants do not want to give the same response
to multiple questions or because they thought their first response was “in-
correct”), we focused on responses to the first open-ended question.
4 We used photographs of men because most people incarcerated in the
United States are male (Carson & Anderson, 2016). Photographs were taken
from Kennedy, Hope, and Raz (2009) and were matched on all variables on
which faces in that dataset were normed (perceived age, familiarity, mood,
memorability, and picture quality).
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Glaser, 2015; Harcourt, 2007), target race did not reliably influence
participants' responses. This finding is consistent with prior work sug-
gesting that children may not become aware of racism and race-based
inequalities until later in childhood (e.g., Quintana, 1994, 1998).
Therefore, the analyses reported in the main text collapse across this
variable.
Based on recommendations for psychologists (Lakens & Evers, 2014;
Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2013), we aimed to recruit approxi-
mately 50 participants of each age group in each condition. We over-
recruited adult participants because we expected that some data would
not be usable (e.g., due to failing an attention check question). Adults
completed the procedure online and read all experimental items to
themselves. They typed their answers to the open-ended item into a
textbox and selected the scale label that best matched their response in
the close-ended portion of the study (i.e., they viewed only the verbal
labels, not the stick figures shown to children). Though children and
adults completed slightly different procedures (e.g., adults responded
using a scale marked only with verbal labels as opposed to seeing
images), past work suggests that such minor methodological mod-
ifications do not exert a reliable influence on adults' responses (see
Brandone, Gelman, & Hedglen, 2015; Heiphetz, Strohminger, Gelman,
& Young, 2018; Shaw, Li, & Olson, 2012). Thus, it is unlikely that any
age-related differences reported in the present study are an artifact of
methodological modifications.
2.2. Results
Analyses that included multiple comparisons were adjusted using a
Bonferroni correction. Below, we report the corrected alpha level
alongside uncorrected p values. Additionally, we report the smallest
effect size that could be detected given the present samples. For ease of
interpretation, we report both the effect sizes and their corresponding
benchmark labels (“small”, “medium”, “large”); these effect sizes were
determined using sensitivity power analyses and assume 80% power
and an alpha=.05. In addition to the main analyses reported below, we
examined whether participant age predicted responses in our data. Age
did not reliably predict children's or adults' responses; see
Supplementary Materials for these analyses. Also see Supplemental
Materials for descriptive statistics and correlations among experimental
items.
2.2.1. What is prison?
Two researchers coded responses to this item using categories de-
veloped based on theoretical interest (how often participants men-
tioned internal characteristics, behavioral factors, and societal factors
when explaining incarceration, see Table 1 for example quotes). Re-
sponses that referred to internally-focused properties of an individual
(e.g., moral character, biological traits) were coded in the internal
characteristics category, while responses that referred to behaviors
were coded in the behavioral factors category. Responses referencing
specific crimes or other behaviors (e.g., describing prison as a place
where people go when they kill someone) or crimes or other behaviors
in a more general sense (e.g., describing prison as a place where people
go when they break the law or when they do something wrong, without
specifying a particular act) were both coded in the behavioral factors
category. The third code was developed to capture responses attributing
incarceration to societal factors that are not specifically tied to any
individual (e.g., describing prison as a place that disproportionately
targets members of marginalized groups).
The coder assigned each response a 1 if it referenced the category
and a 0 if it did not. For example, a participant who reported that prison
“is a place where bad people go” received a 1 in the “internal” category
and a 0 in the remaining categories for this question. Codes were not
mutually exclusive, and a single participant's response could receive
several codes. Thus, no code for “other” responses existed; if partici-
pants failed to mention any of the available categories, they received a
zero for each category. Each response was also coded by a second rater
who was blind to hypotheses and to the first rater's codes. The raters
achieved inter-rater reliabilities of .89 for “internal” codes and .83 for
“behavioral” codes, indicating “substantial” to “almost perfect” agree-
ment (Landis & Koch, 1977). Kappa could not be calculated for “soci-
etal” codes because one rater categorized 100% of responses as falling
outside of this category, leading to invariance. Even so, the other rater
indicated that only 1% of responses referenced societal factors, in-
dicating that the presence of societal codes was rare. Disagreements
were resolved via discussion.
Two types of analyses investigated participants' responses (Fig. 1).
First, chi-squared tests examined potential age differences in responses
falling into each category (internal, behavioral, and societal explana-
tions). Thus, p values needed to be .017 or lower to pass the Bonferroni-
corrected significance threshold. A sensitivity analysis revealed that
this analysis could detect “small” effect sizes (V= .17); all significant
comparisons yielded effect sizes above this threshold. Children were
more likely than adults to mention internal factors (Χ2(1,
N=267)= 57.80, p < .001, V= .47), whereas adults were more
likely than children to mention crimes or other bad behaviors, (Χ2(1,
N=267)= 10.52, p= .001, V= .20). Zero children and only one
adult referenced societal factors when discussing incarceration; no
significant difference emerged between age groups for this category,
(Χ2(1, N=267)=1.61, p= .21, V= .05).
Second, McNemar's tests compared the extent to which children
and, separately, adults mentioned each category versus each other ca-
tegory. This analysis included six comparisons; therefore, p values
needed to be .008 or lower to pass the Bonferroni-corrected significance
threshold. These analyses could detect an odds ratio (OR) of 2.05 for
differences in children's explanations and an OR of 1.73 for differences
in adults' explanations; all significant comparisons yielded odds ratios
above these thresholds. Children were more likely to generate internal
and behavioral explanations than societal explanations (ps < .001,
ORs= infinity); the former two categories did not significantly differ
from each other (p= .382, OR=1.29). Adults were more likely to
generate behavioral explanations than either internal or societal ex-
planations (ps < .001, ORs≥ 27.75); the latter two categories did not
significantly differ from each other (p= .219, OR=5.00).
2.2.2. Agreement with explanations for incarceration
In addition to the open-ended questions described above, partici-
pants used a five-point scale to indicate how much they agreed with
four explanations for incarceration: that the incarcerated person was in
prison because “he is a bad person,” because “he did something wrong,”
Table 1
Coding for “what is prison?” question.
Codes Code descriptions Example quotes
Internal characteristics References internal characteristics, such as the person's perceived
badness
“A place where bad people go” (child)
“A place to contain bad people” (adult)
Behaviors References behaviors “Somewhere you go if you broke the law” (child)
“A place for people who have committed a crime” (adult)
Societal References societal factors that are not specifically tied to any
individual
“A place to put the undesirable/abnormal people that society does not want to deal
with” (adult)
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because “he didn't have very much money when he was growing up,”
and because “he has a younger brother.” Agreement was analyzed using
a 2 (Participant Age: child vs. adult) x 4 (Explanation: internal vs. be-
havioral vs. societal vs. irrelevant) mixed ANOVA with repeated mea-
sures on the second factor. This analysis revealed main effects of
Participant Age (F(1, 260)= 86.37, p < .001, ηp2= .25) and
Explanation (F(2.62, 679.91)= 413.29, p < .001, ηp2= .61), which
were qualified by a Participant Age x Explanation interaction (F(2.62,
679.91)= 36.95, p < .001, ηp2= .12).
To examine the Participant Age x Explanation interaction, we con-
ducted two sets of tests (Fig. 2). First, we investigated whether children
and, separately, adults distinguished among the different explanations.
This analysis included 12 comparisons; therefore, p values needed to be
.004 or lower to pass the Bonferroni-corrected significance threshold.
These analyses could detect “small” effect sizes both for differences in
children's agreement with different explanations (Cohen's d= .28) and
for differences in adults' agreement with different explanations (Cohen's
d= .22); all significant pairwise comparisons yielded effect sizes above
these thresholds. (For consistency across analyses, we report effect sizes
using partial eta squared for all analyses below; see Supplemental
Materials for the Cohen's d associated with each pairwise comparison.)
After applying the Bonferroni correction, the difference in adults'
agreement with the explanation that the person was incarcerated “be-
cause he is a bad person” and “because he didn't have very much money
when he was growing up” dropped to non-significance (F(1,
167)= 7.80, p= .006, ηp2= .05). Other than this exception, adults'
agreement with each explanation differed significantly from agreement
with each other explanation (internal versus behavioral: F(1,
167)= 322.38, p < .001, ηp2= .66; internal versus irrelevant: F(1,
167)= 179.89, p < .001, ηp2= .52; behavioral versus societal: F(1,
167)= 230.55, p < .001, ηp2= .58; behavioral versus irrelevant: F(1,
167)= 830.92, p < .001, ηp2= .83; societal versus irrelevant: F(1,
167)= 107.39, p < .001, ηp2= .39). Similarly, children's agreement
with each explanation differed significantly from agreement with each
other explanation (internal versus behavioral: F(1, 93)= 9.36,
p= .003, ηp2= .09; internal versus societal: F(1, 93)= 143.85,
p < .001, ηp2= .61; internal versus irrelevant: F(1, 93)= 246.43,
p < .001, ηp2= .73; behavioral versus societal: F(1, 93)= 224.49,
p < .001, ηp2= .71; behavioral versus irrelevant: F(1, 93)= 402.22,
p < .001, ηp2= .81; societal versus irrelevant: F(1, 93)= 11.78,
p= .001, ηp2= .11).
Second, we examined whether children and adults provided dif-
ferent responses to each explanation. This analysis included four com-
parisons; therefore, p values needed to be .013 or lower to pass the
Bonferroni-corrected significance threshold. A sensitivity analysis re-
vealed that this analysis could detect a “small” to “medium” sized effect
(Cohen's d= .36) for age-related differences in agreement, and all
significant pairwise comparisons yielded effect sizes above these
thresholds. (As in the analyses above, we report partial eta squared
values below for consistency across analyses; see Supplemental
Materials for the Cohen's d associated with each pairwise comparison.)
Children were more likely than adults to agree with internal (F(1,
260)= 151.85, p < .001, ηp2= .37), behavioral (F(1, 260)= 21.49,
p < .001, ηp2= .08) and irrelevant (F(1, 260)= 16.66, p < .001,
ηp2= .06) explanations. We did not find a significant difference be-
tween children and adults in agreement regarding the societal ex-
planation (F(1, 260)= .09, p= .759, ηp2= 0).
2.3. Discussion
Study 1 examined children's and adults' generation of and agree-
ment with explanations for incarceration as a way to understand the
origin of “end-state” punishment concepts. In doing so, several findings
emerged. Children readily generated and agreed with internal ex-
planations for incarceration; however, this pattern did not emerge
among adults. The discrepancy between children's and adults' responses
suggests that the link between punishment and internal factors wanes
throughout development. Moreover, certain components of punish-
ment-related concepts were stable across development. Adults were






























Fig. 1. Proportion of participants who made internal, behavioral, and societal attributions for incarceration when defining jail or prison in Study 1. Error bars



















Fig. 2. Average agreement with each explanation for incarceration offered in Study 1. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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any other explanation type. Children, like adults, were more likely to
spontaneously attribute incarceration to behavioral factors than soci-
etal-level factors. Thus, the present work suggests that the link between
behaviors and punishment remains stable between the early elementary
school years and adulthood. Lastly, neither children nor adults readily
mentioned or agreed with societal-level explanations for incarceration.
One possible interpretation of this finding is that societal factors may lie
at the periphery of punishment-related concepts throughout develop-
ment (though see General discussion for consideration of alternative
explanations).
3. Study 2
The results of Study 1 suggest that children readily attribute pun-
ishment to internal and behavioral—but not societal—factors. These
findings provide important insight into the structure of early punish-
ment-related concepts; however, because cognition does not occur
within a vacuum, it is important to consider how these early concepts
may depend on social experience. Study 2 included both children of
incarcerated parents and children whose parents were not incarcerated
to examine the extent to which parental incarceration—one particularly
relevant type of social experience—might shape early punishment-re-
lated concepts.
Study 2 also extended Study 1 in several other ways. First, it asked
participants why people might engage in behaviors that are associated
with incarceration (breaking the law). While children in Study 1 re-
ported that both internal factors and behaviors were likely candidates
for why an individual might experience incarceration, previous work
suggests that children view others' behaviors as stemming from their
internal qualities (e.g., traits, Lillard & Flavell, 1990; Liu, Gelman, &
Wellman, 2007). As such, children in Study 1 may have spontaneously
mentioned and agreed with behavioral causes for incarceration while
actually conceptualizing incarceration as being the result of a multi-
factor causal chain. For example, participants in Study 1 could have
reasoned that internal qualities cause bad behaviors and that, in turn,
bad behaviors cause incarceration. An analogous argument can be
made regarding the conceptual link between behavioral and societal
factors. Participants may have reasoned that societal factors cause bad
behaviors and that, in turn, bad behaviors cause incarceration, but
nonetheless attributed incarceration to behavioral factors for the sake
of simplicity. By asking about the cause of behaviors, Study 2 tested
these possibilities.
Second, Study 2 probed perceptions of groups of people as opposed
to individuals (e.g., asking why people in general might break the law
rather than why a specific person broke the law). In Study 1, partici-
pants answered questions about individuals, which may have biased
them toward attributions that linked incarceration with individual-level
factors (e.g., internal factors, behaviors) and away from societal-level
factors that were not clearly linked with a single person. Thus, we
sought to clarify the extent to which the results of Study 1 could be
explained by semantic subtleties in the question stem.
Third, Study 2 recruited 6- to 12-year-olds to gain greater insight
into how perspectives regarding the justice system might change or stay
the same during the elementary school years. Study 1 did not find a
relation between age and the extent to which participants attributed
incarceration to internal factors (see Supplementary Materials), but the
age range among children in that study (ranging from six to eight years
old) may have been too narrow to capture developmental changes. Past
work investigating the developmental trajectory of essentialist rea-
soning suggests that the tendency to attribute phenomena to internal
causes might decrease throughout the elementary school years (e.g.,
Chalik et al., 2017; Gelman et al., 2007; Heiphetz et al., 2017). Thus,
testing a broader range than Study 1 allowed us to determine whether
such a decrease may occur in the domain of the justice system.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
In collaboration with two organizations that provide services to
families of incarcerated individuals, we recruited 24 6- to 12-year-olds
with incarcerated parents (Mage= 9.38 years, SDage= 1.95 years; 46%
female). Parents identified their children as White or European-
American (4%), Black or African-American (58%), multiracial (13%),
or “other” (25%); the remaining parents did not answer this question.
Parents identified their child's ethnicity by answering a separate ques-
tion; 42% of participants were identified as Hispanic or Latina/o.
Because children of incarcerated parents are a difficult-to-recruit po-
pulation, we aimed to test as many participants as possible in one year.
Our final sample size is similar to samples in other studies testing
children (e.g., Gelman et al., 2007; Kushnir, Gopnik, Chernyak, Seiver,
& Wellman, 2015; Misch, Over, & Carpenter, 2016; Over, Eggleston,
Bell, & Dunham, 2018), especially difficult-to-reach populations (e.g.,
children of incarcerated parents, Shlafer & Poehlmann, 2010; trans-
gender children, Olson, Key, & Eaton, 2015; Indian children from
lower-income families, Ahl & Dunham, 2019). Twenty-nine percent of
the children in this sample had an incarcerated mother, and 67% had an
incarcerated father; one child's demographic questionnaire did not in-
dicate the gender of the incarcerated parent. Zero children had two
incarcerated parents. On average, children had been separated from
their parent for 52.64 months (SD=31.78months,
range=8–95months) and had spoken with their parent in person or
via technology (phone, video conferencing) an average of 14.75 times
over the past month (SD=12.37 times, range=1–31 times).
At one location, staff members distributed consent forms and de-
mographic questionnaires to families who had 6- to 12-year-old chil-
dren. Staff alerted us when families returned consent forms and
scheduled appointments for us to interview the children on-site. At the
other location, staff members alerted us when 6- to 12-year-olds were
scheduled to participate in a different on-site activity. Members of our
research team spoke with the child's parent or guardian before or after
the activity; if they provided consent, we then interviewed the child on-
site. In all cases, consent was obtained from the non-incarcerated parent
or guardian, and children also provided assent before beginning the
interview. Responses from one additional child were excluded because
she did not understand the questions; including her responses in ana-
lyses did not alter the pattern of results. Participating families received
a $20 gift card.
We also recruited a group of children whose parents were not in-
carcerated. Based on recommendations for psychologists (Lakens &
Evers, 2014; Simmons et al., 2013), we aimed to recruit approximately
50 participants in this comparison group, although we over-recruited
slightly because we expected that some data would not be usable. The
final sample included 62 children (Mage= 8.11 years, SDage= 1.40
years; 69% female). Parents identified their children as White or Eur-
opean-American (37%), Black or African-American (30%), Asian or
Asian-American (4%), Native American or Pacific Islander (2%), mul-
tiracial (13%), or “other” (15%); the remaining parents did not answer
this question. Parents identified their child's ethnicity by answering a
separate question; 33% of participants were identified as Hispanic or
Latina/o. Four additional children were tested but excluded from sub-
sequent analyses because a parent interfered during testing (n=1), the
child did not understand the questions (n=2), or the child did not
speak English (n=1). Additionally, one child completed the study
twice; analyses only included his responses from the first session.
Children were recruited from a departmental database and from a
museum in a large city in the northeastern United States; all children
received a small prize for participating.
3.2. Procedure
As part of a longer interview, children answered two types of
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questions about their perceptions of the criminal justice system.5 One
question was open-ended: “Why do you think people break the law?”
The purpose of this question was to determine the extent to which
participants explained law-breaking by referencing people's internal
characteristics. The other questions in Study 2 were adapted from a
closed-ended measure used in prior work on children's essentialism
(Gelman et al., 2007). We used these questions to link to prior work on
children's propensity to use internal explanations. The experimenter
said, “Now I'm going to ask you some questions about other people. To
answer these questions, you can say ‘yes’ [coded as 3], ‘maybe’ [coded
as 2], or ‘no’ [coded as 1]. Does that make sense?” The experimenter
then told participants about a person, gender-matched to the partici-
pant, who broke the law and asked six questions about that person.
Sample items included, “Do you think that [name] can change whether
or not he/she's a person who breaks the law, if he/she wants to?” and,
“Has [name] always been a person who breaks the law?” In addition to
asking about a person who broke the law, the experimenter asked about
a person who does good things, a person who does bad things, and a
person who does shy things. We included questions about a person who
does good things and a person who does bad things to investigate how
perceptions of a particular moralized behavior (breaking the law) might
compare with perceptions of morally relevant behaviors more broadly.
We included questions about doing shy things as a non-moral control
variable. All items are available in the journal's online research data
repository.
Participants answered all close-ended questions in one block; the
order of this block and the open-ended question was counterbalanced
across participants. The order in which participants answered questions
about the person who broke the law, the person who does good things,
the person who does bad things, and the person who does shy things
were also counterbalanced, as was the order of the items regarding each
person.
3.3. Results
As discussed above, we recruited a wider age range of children to
clarify whether we would observe changes in essentialism during the
elementary school years. However, we did not find age-related differ-
ences within each group of participants (children with versus without
an incarcerated parent); see Supplementary Materials.
3.3.1. Why do you think people break the law?
Two researchers coded responses to this open-ended question for
the presence of internal, behavioral, and societal explanations. One
coder noticed that, in some cases, the types of explanations participants
offered seemed qualitatively distinct from the explanations offered in
Study 1. For example, some internal explanations referenced stable,
negative characteristics, as did the explanations from Study 1.
However, other explanations referenced internal characteristics that
could potentially change over time, such as thoughts and desires.
Similarly, some behavioral explanations referenced the target's own
behaviors, as did the explanations from Studies 1. However, other ex-
planations focused on someone else's behaviors. To account for these
differences, we subdivided the “internal” code into stable versus po-
tentially temporary characteristics, and we subdivided the “behavioral”
code into the target's own behaviors versus others' behaviors (see
Table 2 for example quotes).6 For consistency across studies, we also
retained a code for all internal explanations (stable and temporary in-
ternal characteristics collapsed into one category) and, separately, a
code for all behavioral explanations (references to the target's own
behaviors and others' behaviors collapsed into one category). This re-
sulted in seven codes (internal overall, internal-stable, internal-tem-
porary, behavioral overall, behavioral-target, behavioral-others, soci-
etal). Across the seven codes, raters reached inter-rater reliabilities
ranging from .53 to .87, indicating “moderate” to “almost perfect”
agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). All disagreements were resolved via
Discussion.
To determine the role that parental incarceration may play in
shaping children's responses, our initial analyses included seven chi-
squared tests to compare the presence versus absence of each code
among children of incarcerated parents versus children whose parents
were not incarcerated. Because this resulted in a total of seven tests, p
values needed to be .007 or lower to pass the Bonferroni-corrected
significance threshold. This approach allowed for a detection of effects
of “medium” size (V= .32). No tests reached significance (Χ2(1,
Ns≥ 74)≤ 1.73, ps≥ .188, Vs≤ .15).
We then used McNemar's tests to compare the extent to which each
group of participants mentioned each category versus each other ca-
tegory. To be consistent with Study 1, we first conducted three com-
parisons within each group of participants: overall internal versus
overall behavioral, overall behavioral versus societal, and overall in-
ternal versus societal. We then conducted two additional comparisons,
again within each group of participants: internal-stable versus internal-
potentially temporary and behavioral-self versus behavioral-others.
This resulted in a total of ten comparisons; therefore, p values needed to
be .005 or lower to pass the Bonferroni-corrected significance
threshold. The sample size of children whose parents were not in-
carcerated allowed for detection of effects of size OR=2.92, and the
sample size of children of incarcerated parents allowed for detection of
effects of size OR=4.66.
Consistent with the results of Study 1, participants were unlikely to
reference societal factors; both groups of children were more likely to
provide both internal explanations and behavioral explanations than
societal explanations (children of incarcerated parents: ps < .001,
ORs= infinity; children whose parents were not incarcerated:
ps≤ .002, ORs≥ 25.00). Additionally, children of incarcerated parents
were more likely to provide internal explanations that focused on po-
tentially temporary characteristics such as thoughts and desires than
explanations highlighting stable internal characteristics such as bad
character (p= .001, OR=14.00). This pattern of results also emerged
when we analyzed responses from children whose parents were not
incarcerated (p < .001, OR=6.75). No other comparisons reached
significance (ps≥ .065, ORs≤ 4.50; Fig. 3).
3.3.2. Closed-ended essentialism measure
We averaged responses to individual items such that a score of 1
indicated the lowest possible essentialism and a score of 3 indicated the
highest possible essentialism. We then analyzed these scores using a 2
(Participant Group: children whose parents were not incarcerated vs.
children of incarcerated parents) x 4 (Target Description: broke the law
vs. does good things vs. does bad things vs. does shy things) mixed
ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor. This analysis
revealed a main effect of Target Description (F(2.65, 209.45)= 33.03,
p < .001, ηp2= .30). Neither the main effect of Participant Group (F(1,
79)= .73, p= .397, ηp2= .01) nor the Participant Group x Target
Description interaction (F(2.65, 209.45)= 1.50, p= .221, ηp2= .02)
reached significance.
To further investigate the main effect of Target Description, we
5 The interview also included other types of questions that were part of a
separate project, such as questions about children's emotions toward close
others.
6 To ensure that the qualitative responses provided in Study 2 actually dif-
fered from those provided in Study 1, the first author re-coded responses in
Study 1 for stable versus temporary internal characteristics and behaviors that
referenced the target's behaviors versus others' behaviors. In Study 1, zero
(footnote continued)
participants referenced internal temporary characteristic or another person's
behavior.
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compared each target with each other target. This resulted in six
comparisons; therefore, p values needed to be .008 or lower to pass the
Bonferroni-corrected significance threshold (see Fig. 4). These analyses
could detect relatively “small” effect sizes (Cohen's d= .31); all sig-
nificant pairwise comparisons yielded effect sizes above these thresh-
olds (For consistency across analyses, we report effect sizes using partial
eta squared for all analyses below; see Supplemental Materials for the
Cohen's d associated with each pairwise comparison). Overall, children
viewed performing good behaviors in more essentialist terms than
breaking the law (F(1, 81)= 66.80, p < .001, ηp2= .45), performing
bad behaviors (F(1, 82)= 53.87, p < .001, ηp2= .40), and performing
shy behaviors (F(1, 80)= 25.67, p < .001, ηp2= .24). Moreover,
children viewed performing shy behaviors in more essentialist terms
than both breaking the law (F(1, 80)= 20.86, p < .001, ηp2= .21) and
performing bad behaviors (F(1, 80)= 11.41, p= .001, ηp2= .13).
Children's views of breaking the law and performing bad behaviors did
significantly not differ from one another (F(1, 81)= .11, p= .740,
ηp2= 0).
3.4. Discussion
Study 2 investigated how children whose parents were not
Table 2
Coding for “why do you think people break the law?” question.
Codes Code descriptions Example quotes
Internal stable characteristics References internally-focused, inherent, stable properties “Because their heart is different” (child whose parent is not incarcerated)
“They're not smart people” (child of incarcerated parent)
Internal temporary characteristics References internally-focused, potentially changeable
characteristics
“Because people don't feel like listening to the laws” (child whose parent is not
incarcerated)
“Some people don't care about laws” (child of incarcerated parent)
Behavioral factors (self) References people's own observable actions, behaviors “Because they don't do the stuff that the police tells them to do” (child whose
parent is not incarcerated)
“They chose to do it” (child of incarcerated parent)
Behavioral factors (others) References others' actions, behaviors, or influence of
another person or group of people
“Because other people have been bad to them” (child whose parent is not
incarcerated)
“They learned from other people that that's good” (child of incarcerated
parent)
Societal factors References externally-focused, societal factors “Don't have money to survive” (child whose parent is not incarcerated)
“They do it for very good reason. If poor, for their family because they have no

































Fig. 3. Proportion of participants who made internal, behavioral, and societal attributions when explaining why people might break the law, Study 2. The “overall
internal” category was coded as present if the participant provided at least one internal-stable explanation or at least one internal-potentially temporary explanation.
The “overall behavioral” category was coded as present if the participant provided at least one behavioral-self explanation or at least one behavioral-others ex-

















Fig. 4. Average essentialism, Study 2. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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incarcerated and children of incarcerated parents view the criminal
justice system. Several notable findings emerged.
First, children of incarcerated parents were more likely to reference
internal and behavioral explanations than societal explanations when
discussing law-breaking. Further, children of incarcerated parents were
more likely to attribute law-breaking to potentially temporary char-
acteristics than stable internal characteristics. Strikingly, this pattern
also emerged when we investigated responses from children whose
parents were not incarcerated. No significant differences emerged be-
tween the two groups of children. However, null effects are difficult to
interpret; it is possible that the two groups of children actually do think
about law-breaking differently, and the current work failed to capture
this difference.
A priori, one might have expected a different pattern of results to
emerge within each group because children of incarcerated parents,
versus children whose parents were not incarcerated, have had more
experience with a significant figure who is in jail or prison.
Additionally, the current samples differed in ways that reflect the de-
mographics of individuals involved in the justice system (e.g., the
proportion of White participants was higher in the sample of children
whose parents were not incarcerated than among children of in-
carcerated parents), and such differences may have led to different
patterns within each group of children. Nevertheless, children of in-
carcerated parents may hear generic messages when learning about
punishment and incarceration from adults (for evidence that adults
routinely use generic language with children, see Gelman et al., 2005,
2008). In turn, these generic statements may license the inference that
punished individuals have an internal “essence” (Rhodes et al., 2012).
Messages about incarceration may be more influential than children's
personal experiences, leading to a similar pattern of results within each
group.
Second, more children referenced internal factors when discussing
law-breaking compared to incarceration. For example, 68% of children
whose parents were not incarcerated attributed law-breaking to an in-
ternal factor in Study 2. However, only 38% of children attributed in-
carceration to an internal factor in Study 1. This result suggests that
children may have spontaneously mentioned and agreed with beha-
vioral causes for incarceration (Study 1) while actually conceptualizing
incarceration as being the result of a multi-factor causal chain (internal
qualities cause behaviors; in turn, behaviors cause incarceration). This
interpretation is consistent with work suggesting that children view
behaviors and internal characteristics as closely linked (e.g., Liu et al.,
2007). However, the present data suggest that the degree of overlap
between children's concepts of behaviors and internal characteristics is
partial, not full. As previously mentioned, children in Study 1 indicated
greater agreement with behavioral rather than internal explanations for
incarceration; this suggests that children understand the difference
between internal qualities and behaviors.
In addition to the overall increase in internal attributions across
studies, participants in Study 2 also referenced potentially temporary
characteristics such as thoughts and desires. One possibility is that
asking specifically about behaviors, which are fleeting by nature, might
facilitate thoughts of other potentially temporary characteristics. If this
is the case, then describing incarceration in terms of behaviors may
reduce stigma against people who have had contact with the justice
system by leading individuals to consider changeable actions rather
than the unchangeable (and often perceived to be bad) essence of
people who have become involved in the justice system. Future work
can test this possibility, which we discuss further in the General dis-
cussion.
Third, children in Study 2, like the children and adults in Study 1,
rarely referenced societal factors such as racism or economic inequality.
Given that different factors (development, parental incarceration) did
not significantly influence the extent to which participants linked in-
carceration (Study 1) and law-breaking (Study 2) with societal factors,
it is possible that the tendency to underestimate the extent to which
societal factors cause negative outcomes is relatively early-emerging
and occurs in diverse domains. This possibility is supported by previous
research demonstrating this phenomenon in other domains and at dif-
ferent points in development (e.g., Kraus et al., 2017; Leahy, 1983). The
consistency of this finding across both studies rules out the possibility
that asking about individuals (Study 1) as opposed to people in general
(Study 2) skewed the results of Study 1. However, the lack of societal
explanations in the present work may be influenced by other factors;
see General discussion for more elaborated discussion on this point.
Finally, although participants demonstrated some degree of essen-
tialism regarding law-breaking on the closed-ended essentialism mea-
sure, they viewed this behavior in less essentialist terms than positively-
valenced behaviors or shy behaviors (which do not have moral va-
lence). This finding is consistent with other work showing that in-
dividuals—especially children—view others optimistically (e.g., by
expecting them to perform good behaviors even if they have previously
transgressed, Aloise, 1993; Boseovski, 2010; Heiphetz, in press;
Lockhart, Chang, & Story, 2002; Tasimi, Gelman, Cimpian, & Knobe,
2017). Here, participants appeared to judge that people who do good
things would continue to do so in the future, whereas people who
committed transgressions (including breaking the law and also in-
cluding doing “bad things” in general) potentially change over time.
Although children appear to readily draw inferences about negative
internal characteristics on the basis of contact with the justice system,
they also appear to optimistically believe that such characteristics can
change over time.
4. General discussion
The present work examined the emergence of punishment-related
concepts in two complementary ways. Study 1 investigated this topic
developmentally by asking which components of children's punish-
ment-related concepts remain into adulthood and which change over
the course of development. Children, like adults, readily attributed in-
carceration to behavioral factors and did not link incarceration with
societal factors. However, unlike adults, children readily attributed
incarceration to internal factors. Study 2 built on the results of Study 1
by testing the extent to which personal experience with the justice
system shapes the emergence of punishment concepts in childhood.
Specifically, Study 2 tested both children of incarcerated parents and
children whose parents were not incarcerated. Both groups of children
were more likely to attribute law-breaking to internal and behavioral
factors than societal factors. Further, when responding to a close-ended
measure of essentialism, both groups of children viewed law-breaking
as somewhat driven by internal, unchanging factors. Moreover, both
groups of children were more likely to view positive behaviors (doing
good things) in more essentialist terms than negative behaviors (law-
breaking, doing bad things).
Taken together, the present work makes two main contributions to
the study of moral cognition. First, the current findings suggest that
“end-state” punishment concepts are comprised of two co-existing
bundles of concepts: those that have remained stable since childhood
and those that have changed over the course of development.
Specifically, Study 1 suggests that the propensity to attribute punish-
ment to behavioral factors and not to societal factors emerges relatively
early in development and remains into adulthood. Moreover, the results
of Study 1 suggest that reliance on internally-focused explanations for
punishment decreases between childhood and adulthood.
While the present work did not test why this latter change might
occur, at least two possibilities exist. One possibility is that this change
is the result of social learning. As children grow into adults, they may
learn that United States law justifies punishment on the grounds of
behavior and not internal characteristics. In turn, the link between
punishment and internal characteristics may weaken. Moreover,
throughout development, children may come to learn that the law often
demonstrates an “outcome bias” in punishment decisions (Cushman
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et al., 2009), sanctioning people more harshly for harmful albeit acci-
dental outcomes (e.g., second degree murder) than failed attempts to
harm (e.g., attempted murder). Due to increased knowledge about these
norms, people may come to reduce their use of internal explanations for
punishment. Another possibility, in addition to social learning, is that
age-related changes in cognition may shape punishment concepts
across development. For instance, as discussed above, children are more
likely than adults to attribute a host of properties to internal, un-
changing “essences” (e.g., Chalik et al., 2017; Heiphetz, in press; Taylor
et al., 2009). The decrease in reliance on internal explanations across
development could reflect a more domain-general decrease in attri-
buting phenomena to internal causes. Future research can examine the
extent to which social learning and changes in cognition—among other
factors—drive changes in punishment concepts across development.
Second, the present work clarifies the role of personal experience
with the justice system in shaping early punishment-related concepts.
Drawing on past scholarship suggesting that increased contact with
members of a particular group can alter essentialist views of that
group's members (e.g., Roberts & Gelman, 2016; Smyth et al., 2017), it
was possible that different patterns of results would emerge among
children of incarcerated parents and children whose parents were not
incarcerated. However, a separate literature highlighting the influence
of social input on children's concepts (e.g., Gelman, 2009) suggests that
a similar pattern of results could emerge among each group of children.
The present work marshaled support for the latter possibility. One in-
terpretation of this finding is that children's propensity to make internal
attributions is more sensitive to the information they receive from so-
cial input (e.g., listening to others) than to a prolonged relationship
with only one member of the relevant group. More specifically, it is
possible that the propensity to link punishment with internal char-
acteristics during childhood may be driven by how adults communicate
with children. Adults often use generics—grammatical forms that
convey a property that generalizes to an entire category, such as “girls
like pink”—when speaking with children (e.g., Gelman et al., 2005;
Gelman et al., 2008). Thus, it is possible that adults use similar lan-
guage when talking to children about punishment (e.g., “bad people go
to prison”). Because generic statements lead children to hold essenti-
alist views about the category being described (Rhodes et al., 2012), it
is possible that the use of generic language underlies similarities be-
tween groups of children in the present work. Because the current work
did not directly test the role of generic language in shaping children's
punishment concepts, future research can more directly test this pos-
sibility by observing how adults communicate with children about
punishment and how these messages may, in turn, shape children's
perspectives.
For a number of reasons, it is particularly surprising that partici-
pants failed to reference societal factors when discussing incarceration
or law-breaking. Societal inequality is strikingly high in the United
States, particularly within the criminal justice system (e.g., Alexander,
2012; Eberhardt et al., 2006; Eubanks, 2018; Forbes, 2016; Glaser,
2015; Harcourt, 2007). As such, it is startling that American adults
seem largely unaware of the scope and deleterious consequences of
societal inequality in this context. Though children have less social
experience than adults, it is still somewhat surprising that they did not
attribute incarceration or law-breaking to societal factors. Children are
especially likely to hold positive views of others (e.g., Boseovski, 2010)
and therefore could have been especially motivated to attribute in-
carceration and law-breaking to factors that would maintain positivity
toward people impacted by the justice system. According to research
from the attribution theory literature (e.g., Rudolph et al., 2004), one
way to do so is to attribute stigmatized qualities (e.g., incarceration
status) to externally-oriented, uncontrollable variables (e.g., societal
factors) as opposed to controllable individual-level factors (e.g., bad
behaviors). Following this reasoning, children could have been espe-
cially likely to mention societal factors in order to maintain their po-
sitive views of the people they evaluated. Moreover, given that children
of incarcerated parents are especially likely to experience societal-level
inequalities (e.g., poverty, homelessness, Clear, 2007; Huebner &
Gustafson, 2007; Wildeman, 2014), one may have expected that they
would be especially likely to link punishment with societal factors.
What might explain the absence of societal explanations throughout
the present studies? One possibility is that children and adults experi-
enced difficulty explaining how societal factors are linked with pun-
ishment. There are several causal links between societal factors and
incarceration. For example, consider a Black adolescent who was ar-
rested for dealing drugs. Upon further inspection, it turns out that he
was engaging in this behavior to help his family pay for basic neces-
sities and was the target of racialized policing practices; his White peers
were not arrested for the same action (for additional evidence that
police arrest White adolescents less frequently than Black adolescents
despite similar rates of law breaking across groups, see Alexander,
2012; Forman, 2017; Joseph & Pearson, 2002). While this person's in-
carceration was certainly influenced by societal factors (e.g., poverty,
racism), the most proximal causal of his incarceration was his behavior.
Given that children and adults tend to provide simple explanations for
events (Bonawitz & Lombrozo, 2012; Lombrozo, 2007), it is possible
that they simply agreed with—and generated—explanations that are
most causally linked with punishment.
While this idea should be examined more thoroughly in future re-
search, the consistent paucity of societal explanations across Studies 1
and 2 partially rules out this possibility. By asking about behaviors
(Study 2) as opposed to incarceration (Study 1), we effectively in-
creased the causal proximity between societal factors and the outcome
being examined. If the dearth of societal explanations in Study 1 was
simply due to participants endorsing behavioral explanations while
nonetheless conceptualizing behaviors as stemming from societal fac-
tors, we might have expected the proportion of societal explanations to
increase in Study 2. However, this was not the case, as participants in
Study 2 did not readily attribute law-breaking to societal factors.
Another possible reason for the lack of societal explanations across
studies is that the tendency to reference societal inequalities when ex-
plaining social phenomena may be moderated by factors that were not a
central aspect of the current research. For instance, among adults, the
tendency to use societal explanations may be associated with racial
group membership (Hunt, 1996). It is difficult to test for this possibility
in our data because of the extremely low rate at which participants
spontaneously generated and agreed with societal explanations. How-
ever, had our sample included more Black people, societal explanations
may have been more prevalent. Regardless as to why participants did
not reference societal factors when discussing law-breaking or in-
carceration, the present work dovetails with other research suggesting
that people tend to underreport the role of societal factors (e.g., eco-
nomic inequality) in causing negative outcomes in people's lives (e.g.,
Davidai & Gilovich, 2015; Kraus et al., 2017; Leahy, 1983; Norton &
Ariely, 2011).
4.1. Limitations and directions for future research
The present work sheds light on an understudied topic within the
social psychological literature (incarceration) and provides critical in-
sight into the role that two factors (age, parental incarceration status)
might play in the structure of punishment-related concepts. However,
there are key limitations to the present work. Views of punishment and
the criminal justice system may hinge on factors not explicitly tested in
this work. As previously mentioned, the negative consequences of in-
carceration disproportionately accrue to members of marginalized
groups, including racial minorities (e.g., Alexander, 2012) and poor
people (e.g., Eubanks, 2018). Thus, future work could examine the role
that identification with each of the aforementioned groups might play
in the development of punishment-related concepts. Another fruitful
avenue for future research could examine how the experience of in-
tersecting social identities (e.g., being a child of incarcerated parents
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growing up in a rural or an urban place) might shape how people
conceptualize punishment. Past work on intersectionality suggests that
the experience of having an incarcerated parent in a rural environment,
for example, is not tantamount to the experience of having an in-
carcerated parent plus the experience of growing up in a rural area
(e.g., Crenshaw, 1989/1993; Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008). Rather,
intersecting identities can create emergent realities. All of the children
of incarcerated parents interviewed for this project were growing up in
an urban area, and their experiences may differ from those of children
growing up in other locations. Future research can examine how such
experiences, as well as other intersecting identities (e.g., race, gender,
class), shape punishment-related concepts.
Another avenue for future research concerns the issue of societal
explanations. We interpret the present results to suggest that neither
children nor adults in our samples readily linked incarceration or law-
breaking with societal factors. However, an alternate possibility exists:
participants may not have agreed with the societal explanation we used
(poverty) because they viewed other types of societal factors (e.g., ra-
cism) as more likely to cause incarceration. This account seems unlikely
given that participants could have referenced such factors when re-
sponding to open-ended questions. As previously mentioned, partici-
pants rarely referenced any type of societal factor when discussing in-
carceration or law-breaking, suggesting that they may not view either
as linked with societal factors broadly construed (though see Vasilyeva,
Gopnik, & Lombrozo, 2018 for evidence that children and adults are
able to engage in structural reasoning when thinking about other social
phenomena). Future work can test children's and adults' agreement
with different types of societal explanations, including those referen-
cing race-based inequality.
Finally, future work can investigate the consequences of adopting
essentialist perspectives of incarceration and punishment more broadly.
In rare instances, essentialism increases positivity; for example, essen-
tialist views of sexual orientation predict more positive attitudes toward
gay men and lesbians (e.g., Haslam & Levy, 2006). However, the ma-
jority of prior work on essentialism's consequences has demonstrated
negative outcomes for essentialized group members. For example, es-
sentializing race increases comfort with racial inequality (Williams &
Eberhardt, 2008), and essentializing gender increases acceptance of
gender stereotypes (Brescoll & LaFrance, 2004). Among children, es-
sentialist views of a particular group are linked with increases in ste-
reotyping (e.g., Pauker, Ambady, & Apfelbaum, 2010), prejudiced at-
titudes (e.g., Diesendruck & Menahem, 2015), and stinginess (Rhodes,
Leslie, Saunders, Dunham, & Cimpian, 2018) toward members of that
group. Perhaps most closely related to the current work, recent scho-
larship (Heiphetz, in press) suggests that essentialist views of immoral
character decrease generosity toward essentialized targets. Thus, es-
sentialist explanations regarding punishment may increase negativity
toward people receiving punishment. If this is the case, then providing
non-essentialist explanations for everyday punishments may allow in-
dividuals to modulate the punishment's severity. For example, children
may feel better if their parents explicitly communicate that they are
receiving punishment because they have done something wrong and
not because they are bad people. Further, non-essentialist explanations
may also reduce the stigma faced by individuals who have received
more severe punishments, such as incarceration.
5. Conclusion
Across two studies, we investigated the emergence of punishment-
related concepts. Children largely conceptualized incarceration as
stemming from both internal and behavioral factors, whereas adults
primarily attributed incarceration to behavioral factors. Neither chil-
dren nor adults readily generated or agreed with societal explanations
for incarceration. These findings suggest that certain components of
children's punishment concepts (i.e., the link between punishment and
behavioral—but not societal—factors) remain stable over the course of
development whereas other components (the link between punishment
and internal factors) change with age. Moreover, we found that the
structure of early punishment concepts was similar across groups of
children with different experiences with the criminal justice system.
Children of incarcerated parents, like children whose parents were not
incarcerated, readily referenced internal and behavioral reasons when
discussing why people break the law. However, neither group of chil-
dren was likely to reference societal factors when reasoning about law-
breaking. Taken together, these studies marshal evidence suggesting
that (1) the conceptual link between punishment and behaviors is stable
across development, (2) the link between punishment-related concepts
and internal factors wanes across development, and (3) regardless of
age or personal relationships with incarcerated individuals, people may
not readily report that societal factors play a role in law-breaking and
punishment. These findings highlight the importance of research pro-
grams that cut across areas of study (e.g., social and developmental
psychology) and point to the need for explicit education regarding the
role of social inequality in some forms of punishment.
Open practices
The experimental scripts have been included in Supplemental
Materials, available online.
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